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Summary 
 
The ongoing conflict in and around Chechnya is helping to feed the wider international jihadi 
movement, and is endangering the West as well as Russia. The next “soft target” of North Caucasian 
terrorism could be a Western one. Mutual recriminations over the conflict have badly damaged relations 
between Russia and the West. While most of the blame for this lies with Russian policies, the Western 
approach to the issue has often been unhelpful and irresponsible. Denunciations of Russian behaviour 
have not been matched by a real understanding of the Chechen conflict or a real commitment to help. In 
their own interest, Western countries need urgently to address the crisis in the North Caucasus. This 
requires them to recognize the seriousness of the threat, to open a real dialogue on cooperation with 
Russia rather than simply making criticisms, and to make a serious economic contribution to the region. 
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Relations at an Impasse 
In 2004, Western countries’ dealings with Russia over the 
war in Chechnya reached an impasse, full of mutual 
suspicion and denunciation. If this situation is allowed to 
continue, any positive Western contribution to the 
improvement of conditions in the North Caucasus will 
remain virtually impossible, and the situation there is likely 
to become increasingly dangerous for Russia and the West. 
The principal blame for the tension with the West over 
Chechnya lies with Russian policy. However, the Western 
approach to the conflict has too often been unhelpful and 
irresponsible. On the Russian side, first the Yeltsin and then 
the Putin administrations have grossly mismanaged 
Chechnya. The first Russian military intervention, of 
December 1994, was unnecessary, rash, and brutal. The 
second, of October 1999, though more justified, was 
premature and savagely conducted. As in the first 
intervention, indiscriminate force was too often used. 
Grozny has twice been bombarded into ruin. The fact that 
such action has numerous parallels in Western military 
campaigns does not make it any more acceptable. 
On the ground, Russian servicemen have committed many 
well-documented atrocities against Chechnya’s civilian 
population. As of 2005, the Russian armed forces have to a 
great extent won the main military campaign in Chechnya, 
but this has only led Chechen extremists and their allies to 
resort to larger-scale and more monstrous terrorist attacks 
on “soft targets” outside Chechnya, including the Dubrovka 
theatre in Moscow in October 2002 and the school in 
Beslan in September 2004. 
A Broader Problem in the North Caucasus 
The problems stemming from the Chechen conflict have 
broadened. It is no longer accurate simply to talk about 
“Chechen militants”. The hostage-takers in Beslan included 
Ingush and individuals from other parts of the North 
Caucasus. Since defeating the Russian army in the war of 
1994-1996, the Chechen radicals and their international 
allies have had an agenda of undermining Russian rule 
across the whole North Caucasus. 
In recent years, entrenched poverty, corruption, criminality, 
and ethno-religious divisions in the region have 
strengthened their chances. While the situation in Chechnya 
is slowly improving, things are getting markedly worse in 
neighbouring North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Daghestan, 
Kabardino-Balkharia, and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. 
The North Caucasus has a long history of communal strife 
that erupted again in the 1990s. The bloodiest episode was 
a conflict between ethnic Ingush and Ossetians over a land 
dispute that took more than 600 lives in 1992. The region is 
also chronically underdeveloped, with high unemployment 
and poverty rates, and low average wages and per capita 
incomes. 
These socioeconomic problems are breeding instability and 
radicalism. Radical Islamist influence has risen since the 
mid- 1990s, when militant groups entrenched themselves in 
the region. The growth of militancy has only been 
exacerbated by the heavy-handed reaction of the 
authorities, who have, for example, closed down virtually 
all the mosques in Kabardino-Balkharia. 
The first modern Chechen war, of 1994-1996, largely 
stopped at the borders of Chechnya. Chechen separatists 
received very little support from their regional neighbours. 
Today, this pattern has changed, as demonstrated by direct 
Ingush involvement in a raid on the Ingushetian city of 
Nazran in June 2004 and the participation of Ingush and 
members of other North Caucasus ethnic groups in the 
terrorist attack on the school in Beslan in September 2004. 
Although reliable data are also hard to come by, much of 
the Chechen rebel movement has clearly adopted a wider 
radical agenda that goes beyond only independence for 
Chechnya. During and after the war of 1994-1996, a small 
but influential group of international jihadi fighters based 
themselves in Chechnya under the leadership of an Arab 
with the nom de guerre of Khattab, while home-grown 
rebel leaders, such as Shamil Basayev, Arbi Barayev, and 
Movladi Udugov, allied themselves with this group and 
began to look to Middle Eastern Islamists for support. 
Arabs based in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, alongside 
Chechen fighters, were associated with an alleged plot to 
launch a terrorist attack in London using the poison ricin. 
Members of the international jihadi movement have sought 
to exploit the Chechen conflict for their own wider ends, 
just as they have in Palestine, Kashmir, and many other 
places, and unfortunately, with considerable success. This 
strategy has been set out by Al Qaeda’s second-in-
command, Aiman al-Zawahiri, in his pamphlet “Knights 
Under the Prophet’s Banner”. 2 | Hill, Lieven & de Waal 
Although Russian claims about the importance of the 
international terrorist element in the Chechen conflict are 
often exaggerated, this factor is nonetheless a real and 
important one. There clearly is now an ideological and 
financial link between the Chechen radicals and 
international jihadi terrorists, and there is also a 
demonstration effect. Terror tactics adopted by jihadis in 
Chechnya have been propagated by video and the Internet 
and adopted elsewhere, including in Iraq. This link with 
international jihadi terrorism should be of direct concern to 
Western governments because they must face the 
possibility that the next soft target of North Caucasian 
terrorism could be a Western one. 
President Putin has provided an opening for a more positive 
Western role in the region by informing German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of his desire for active 
Western involvement in the economic development of the 
North Caucasus region. The West should exploit this 
opening by actively pursuing intensive talks with Russian 
officials on how such a programme can be developed in 
detail. 
This approach should involve both Western state aid 
organizations and international financial institutions, like 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Western-supported programmes should include restoring 
transport and communications links, improving social 
infrastructure like housing and electricity, creating new 
educational institutions, and helping in the creation and 
growth of small businesses. Western help to the North 
Caucasus region will be good in itself, and will be good for 
the West because it will help to limit the spread of Islamist 
extremism and terrorism. It will also help to develop a 
climate of trust between Russia and the West, which should 
give the West greater chances of exerting a positive 
influence in Moscow over the conflict in Chechnya and 
other areas of concern. 
A Flawed Foreign Response 
Foreign responses to the conflict in Chechnya have too 
often been marked by ignorance, bad faith, and the 
projection of other agendas. Western politicians have 
repeatedly let their own political aims vis-à-vis Russia 
shape their reaction to events in Chechnya. In 1994–1996, 
for example, Western support for Boris Yeltsin in his 
purported struggles with the remnants of the Communist 
Party constantly softened Western criticism of Russian 
brutalities in Chechnya. More recently, two other agendas – 
the war on terror and a growing campaign to try to limit 
Russian influence in the states of the former Soviet Union – 
have further distorted Western thinking about Chechnya. 
On the other hand, much of Western public comment on 
Chechnya has been uninformed or biased against Russia. 
Both media and policy elites disregarded the real threats to 
Russian security and to the stability of the North Caucasus 
emanating from Chechnya during its period of quasi-
independence between 1997 and 1999. In those years, the 
Western media largely failed to report the wave of savage 
kidnappings against Russian citizens, including senior 
Russian officials, and the establishment in Chechnya of 
international Islamist extremists. Casualty figures in 
Chechnya have often been grossly exaggerated by Western 
journalists and commentators (see box on page 5). These 
have in fact reduced markedly in recent years. 
While Chechens complain justifiably of the very high level 
of official and unofficial criminality and violence in their 
republic, there are also some modest signs of improvement 
in everyday life in Chechnya. Running water and electricity 
are more readily available, checkpoints are much reduced, 
travel is less restricted, and mobile phone usage is now 
possible in the republic. 
None of these improvements suggest that violence and 
atrocities in Chechnya are by any means over, but in 
portraying Chechnya as an unchanging, unmitigated horror, 
the West has precluded an honest discussion with Moscow 
about the conflict. It has also treated Chechnya in a manner 
very different from its treatment of similar separatist 
conflicts in Turkey, India, and other states aligned with the 
West. 
In the case of Turkey, the EU took a harder line on human 
rights than the United States, but both were careful always 
to stress their support for the basic aims of the Turkish 
campaign and for Turkish territorial integrity. Unlike in the 
case of Chechnya, they were also careful to recognize and 
praise any progress made in terms of respect for human 
rights, and in the case of the EU, to offer incentives for 
such progress in terms of greater integration into Europe. 
Finally, while Western officials and commentators have 
continued to press the need for a “political solution” to the 
Chechen conflict, with very rare exceptions they have not 
suggested what this political solution should or could be, 
beyond a call for Moscow to negotiate directly with former 
Chechen president and separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov. 
Nor have they suggested in any detail how the West might 
support a political solution. 
In fact, hopes of long-term amelioration of the situation in 
Chechnya depend not on a solution but a process involving 
growing political participation, economic development, and 
the gradual creation of a modern society in Chechnya. This 
needs to be set in the wider context of development for the 
region as a whole. 
Although Aslan Maskhadov maintains an important 
symbolic value for a segment of the Chechen people as the 
legitimately elected former president, simply talking to 
Maskhadov is no solution. He is the face most familiar to 
Western observers, but he does not represent the only 
political force in Chechnya and does not control a large part 
of the Chechens fighting against Russia. Maskhadov’s 
ability to solve the Chechen conflict and to provide peace 
has dramatically declined over the years. Although he 
retains standing in the Chechen population, he has lost the 
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should be part of a future process, but he cannot be the sole 
element. 
The Need for New Perceptions 
The first step that the West needs to take is to change the 
nature of the conversation that its representatives have with 
Moscow about Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Their 
approach needs to be more sophisticated, more detailed, 
and more focused on offering practical solutions to a range 
of problems that affect other countries as well as Russia. 
Russia should rightly be reminded of the commitments it 
made to defend human rights when it joined institutions 
like the Council of Europe. But these reminders should be 
accompanied by a recognition that progress has been made, 
and assurances that the West is not just interested in 
berating Russia but is genuinely ready to offer practical 
help in dealing with the problems in the North Caucasus. 
There will be no single solution to the Chechen conflict in 
the sense of a “quick fix” – an agreement or treaty that 
would end the violence. A very large number – perhaps a 
majority – of the fighters in Chechnya and those carrying 
out terrorist attacks in Russia will continue to do so 
irrespective of any settlement, whether for ideological or 
personal reasons, just as they did after the Russian 
withdrawal from Chechnya in 1996. 
It should be remembered that leading Chechen commanders 
and their Islamist allies revolted against the authority of 
President Aslan Maskhadov after the conclusion of the 
Khasavyurt Accord and the establishment of quasi-
independence in 1996. They did so in the name of the 
creation of an Islamist republic and the continuation of 
jihad against Russia, and despite the fact that Maskhadov 
had been elected president by an overwhelming majority of 
Chechens in January 1997. 
One of the weaknesses of the Khasavyurt documents was 
that they stipulated a decision on the final status of 
Chechnya within the relatively short period of five years. 
The clock was set ticking on Chechnya’s possible formal 
independence from the very beginning. This heightened the 
inevitable tensions between Grozny and Moscow in the 
post-war period and meant that Russian- Chechen official 
meetings, instead of concentrating on vital immediate 
issues like reconstruction, crime, and extremism, were 
constantly diverted into fruitless bickering over the 
question of formal independence. 
Today, after a decade of war and devastation, and against a 
backdrop of similar conflicts in the international arena, it 
should be clear that, for a very long time to come, the 
development of a Chechen state and of a new Chechen 
political society will have to take place within the Russian 
Federation, and that independence for Chechnya is off the 
agenda for many years to come. This now seems to be 
accepted by the great majority of Chechens, including 
officials of Aslan Maskhadov’s “government” in exile. 
Recovery from the physical and socioeconomic devastation 
of the past decade, and the struggle against Islamist 
extremism, are far greater priorities. Moreover, the periods 
of de facto independence in 1991-1994, and still more in 
1997-1999, proved disastrous experiences. The wide 
realization of this fact marks an evolution from views on 
independence held both in Chechnya and in the West in 
1996. 
New Western Approaches 
Given the inevitability of Chechnya’s medium-term 
development within the Russian Federation, the West 
should also recognize that President Putin’s current strategy 
of “Chechenisation”, along with the progressive restoration 
of the full autonomy of the Chechen republic, could 
provide the basis for future cooperation between Western 
governments and Moscow. 
However, it would be a grave mistake to believe that 
Moscow’s current strategy in Chechnya or the North 
Caucasus as a whole is remotely adequate. Criminality and 
corruption in Chechnya and beyond are at catastrophic 
levels. Amongst the worst culprits are federal forces and 
the so-called Kadyrovtsy, fighters grouped around Ramzan 
Kadyrov, the son of former pro-Moscow leader Akhmad 
Kadyrov. The Kadyrovtsy are responsible for extrajudicial 
killings, abductions, and torture. Moreover, even if overall 
levels of violence have decreased, daunting socioeconomic, 
health, and psychological problems remain. 
Although the tent camps in Ingushetia have been closed, 
tens of thousands of displaced people continue to live in 
substandard accommodations, both in Ingushetia and in 
Chechnya itself. Chechens are also increasingly seeking 
refugee status and asylum in Europe. In a detailed survey of 
displaced people in Ingushetia and Chechnya in 2004, 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) found that more than 90 
percent of respondents had been exposed to violence, with 
about one sixth of those surveyed stating that they had 
witnessed the violent death of a member of their nuclear 
family in the conflict. MSF recorded extremely high levels 
of emotional distress and physical illness, including most 
notably tuberculosis. 
This means that the West should present a more nuanced 
message. While reaffirming Russia’s territorial integrity 
and welcoming federal efforts to rebuild Chechnya, it must 
speak firmly about the alarming human rights situation and, 
in particular, the behaviour of the Kadyrovtsy. The message 
that can be delivered should be one of concern at Moscow’s 
failure to control its local allies rather than one blaming the 
Kremlin for deliberately unleashing violence on ordinary 
Chechens. 
A central problem in Chechnya has always been that the 
armed forces, whether Russian, Chechens allied to Russia, 
or separatist, tend to become criminalized entities beholden 
only unto themselves. Thus, murder, theft, extortion, and 
kidnapping by the Russian troops and their local allies have 
undermined any goodwill Chechens might ever feel toward 4 | Hill, Lieven & de Waal 
the Russian government or the Moscow-backed authorities 
in Chechnya. 
 
Western Media Accounts of Chechen Casualties 
Since the renewed Russian military intervention in 1999, some 
elements of the Western media have routinely referred to 
civilian casualties from both Chechen wars in the range of 
250,000. This is despite the fact that even most Russian human 
rights groups opposed to the Putin administration estimate 
around 80,000-100,000 total casualties, including Russian 
soldiers and Chechen fighters. 
Western media and policy elites have also failed to recognize 
that the scale of the conflict within Chechnya has changed 
greatly since 2002. Nor have they acknowledged Russian 
official attempts – albeit limited and inadequate – to address 
human rights abuses by Russian forces. 
According to the Russian Human Rights group, Memorial, 293 
Chechen residents were killed in 2004. This number included 
114 civilians, 101 security personnel, and 36 fighters, with the 
remainder local government officials and their families or 
unidentified. A further 173 people were abducted by unknown 
assailants and disappeared without a trace. Memorial monitors 
only five of Chechnya’s seventeen regions, including heavily 
populated Grozny but excluding the mountains where much of 
the fighting is taking place, and reports only on cases where it 
has direct evidence. So the real casualty figures may be very 
considerably higher. But this does still mark a welcome 
reduction in overall levels of violence. 
The figures are in stark contrast to the estimated 10,000–
20,000 killed in 1999-2002. The Memorial estimate for the 
plains of Chechnya in 2004 is exceeded by the numbers killed 
in the Nazran and Beslan terrorist attacks outside Chechnya, 
and is considerably less than the 400-500 people estimated by 
the Economist (January 1, 2005) to have been killed by the 
U.S. military in the Iraqi city of Ramadi alone in the months 
since September 2004. It may then be more appropriate today 
to talk about widespread armed criminality and political 
violence rather than full-scale war in Chechnya. 
The West must continue, therefore, to push Russia greatly 
to improve its overall strategy and the political process it is 
trying to establish in Chechnya. This relates to: 
•  The need to rein in the behaviour of Russian security 
forces and their Chechen allies toward the population 
and to prosecute abuses much more extensively. 
•  A real amnesty for all Chechen fighters (as opposed to 
the dubious amnesties offered in the past), including for 
those who have killed Russian soldiers and civilians, on 
the model of the British amnesty for IRA and Loyalist 
terrorists in Northern Ireland. The only exception should 
be those guilty of planning bestial atrocities like Beslan. 
•  The need for the Russian state to make the political 
process in Chechnya much more genuinely democratic 
and pluralist. At the very least, Moscow should allow 
real competition for power between Chechen leaders 
who accept membership in the Russian Federation. 
A key test of Russian behaviour concerning this last point 
will be parliamentary elections in Chechnya. The Russian 
government has announced that these elections will be held 
in 2005, but has not yet set a date. The West should hold 
the Kremlin to this promise, and offer support, recognition, 
and legitimacy in return for guarantees that the elections 
will be free and fair. If properly conducted, the elections 
could be used to take the political and economic monopoly 
away from the Kadyrovtsy and to bring in respected 
Chechens both from Chechnya and from the Chechen 
diaspora in Russia, who thus far have been excluded from 
the political process. 
Unfortunately, while none of this is formally opposed to the 
stated goals of Russian policy in Chechnya, in practice it 
runs against much of the spirit of Vladimir Putin’s political 
strategy in Russia as a whole, with its tendency toward 
centralization and the weakening of autonomous 
institutions. In Chechnya, this is reflected in a continued 
reliance on the Kadyrovtsy to the exclusion of all other 
potential allies. This, however, need not be an insuperable 
obstacle. In practice, Russian officials recognize that 
Chechnya is a very special case, and the Kremlin might be 
able to accept a special status for Chechnya in return for 
full Western support and a better chance of combating 
terrorism. 
For a more sensible and effective approach to be accepted 
by the Russian government, Western interlocutors need to 
offer serious incentives. An opening in this regard has been 
provided by the Putin administration’s desire for 
international economic help in developing the North 
Caucasus region. This was stated by President Putin during 
his meeting with Chancellor Schroeder in December 2004 
and has led to preliminary discussions between Russian 
officials and representatives of international financial 
institutions. 
Western incentives to Russia to change its strategy in 
Chechnya should include: 
•  Explicit and repeated support for Russian territorial 
integrity. 
•  Intensified technical assistance to Russia to help cut off 
funding to the Chechen separatists from the Middle East 
and to capture or kill extremist leaders like Shamil 
Basayev. 
•  A commitment to secure the Georgian- Russian border 
against infiltration by Chechen and international jihadi 
fighters. The Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring contingent on 
this border has been not very effective, but Russia’s 
veto of its extension is unjustified and risks dangerous 
consequences. Intensive discussions should take place 
with Moscow on how the West can help to increase 
security on this frontier. 
•  Substantial aid to Chechnya to support a settlement and 
political process as part of a general package of aid from 
Western governments and international institutions 
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•  In particular, support for programmes aimed at helping 
Chechen refugees return to their homes and rebuild their 
lives. 
•  Support for genuine elections in Chechnya. In return for 
Russian guarantees in this regard, the West should 
accept President Putin’s invitation to send international 
election monitors to cover the elections and – if they do 
in fact merit this – to legitimize them in the eyes of the 
Chechens and the world. 
•  The creation of an international working group that 
could assist with the development of a more pluralistic 
political process, similar to the groups set up to facilitate 
the peace processes in Northern Ireland and in 
Tajikistan (where Russia itself was directly involved). 
Such a working group could be created under the auspices 
of the United Nations Security Council, or the G8-
organizations in which Russia feels it has a major role and 
an important stake, and which are not likely to be seen as 
automatically biased against Russian views and interests. 
Unfortunately, the Council of Europe and the OSCE are no 
longer useful bodies from this point of view. 
None of this will bring about an early or complete end to 
the violence in Chechnya. As in Palestine, Kashmir, and 
elsewhere, however, an internationally backed political 
process will however contribute to isolating the extremists 
and terrorists, and rallying moderate Chechens to fight 
against them. It will also help lay the basis for a modern 
Chechen society, with political parties and civic 
institutions, and for a developed Chechen economy. 
This kind of modernization will be essential to peace and 
progress for the Chechen people whether or not they remain 
permanently within the Russian Federation, and indeed for 
the North Caucasus as a whole. Such development in the 
region is vitally important to Russia, but in the context of 
the threat from Islamist extremism and terrorism, it should 
also be of great importance to the West. 
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